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Abstract
Given the extreme heterogeneity of actors and groups participating in terrorist
actions, investigating and assessing their characteristics can be important to
extract relevant information and enhance the knowledge on their behaviors. The
present work will seek to achieve this goal via a complex networks approach. This
approach will allow finding latent clusters of similar terror groups using
information on their operational characteristics. Specifically, using open access
data of terrorist attacks occurred worldwide from 1997 to 2016, we build a
multi-partite network that includes terrorist groups and related information on
tactics, weapons, targets, active regions. We propose a novel algorithm for cluster
formation that expands our earlier work that solely used Gower’s coefficient of
similarity via the application of Von Neumann entropy for mode-weighting. This
novel approach is compared with our previous Gower-based method and a
heuristic clustering technique that only focuses on groups’ ideologies. The
comparative analysis demonstrates that the entropy-based approach tends to
reliably reflect the structure of the data that naturally emerges from the baseline
Gower-based method. Additionally, it provides interesting results in terms of
behavioral and ideological characteristics of terrorist groups. We furthermore
show that the ideology-based procedure tends to distort or hide existing patterns.
Among the main statistical results, our work reveals that groups belonging to
opposite ideologies can share very common behaviors and that Islamist/jihadist
groups hold peculiar behavioral characteristics with respect to the others.
Limitations and potential work directions are also discussed, introducing the idea
of a dynamic entropy-based framework.
Keywords: Terrorism; Political Violence; Community Detection; Computational
Criminology; Von Neumann Entropy; Gower’s Coefficient
Introduction
Complex networks have demonstrated their potential in many different domains.
Approaches that rely on dynamic, multi-mode, multi-partite and meta-networks
have been fruitful in shedding light on a wide variety of phenomena, including
social ones [3, 16, 18, 56]. In the last years, this process has indeed also touched
areas as criminology, international security, and terrorism research [6, 22, 39] .
This methodological shift has been facilitated by the increasing availability of
open access data sets, the sensibility and interest of social scientists towards novel
empirical approaches and the dramatic popularity of statistical software and data-
science oriented languages. In spite of this shift, several critical points and pitfalls
have been highlighted by scholars regarding the actual results of scientific inquiry
in the field of terrorism research. Sageman [51], for instance, noted that the lacking
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collaboration between intelligence and academia led to a stagnation that is mainly
motivated by the scarcity of rich, detailed and precise data on terrorist groups and
events, which makes it difficult for researchers to develop models that are actually
useful in reducing or assessing the terrorist threat.
In fact, Sageman argued that the intelligence community should be more willing
to share crucial and rich data sets to the academia, in order to exploit their method-
ological rigour and capabilities. Recently, in an attempt to extensively review the
field of terrorism research, Schuurman [52] noted that many longstanding weak-
nesses and issues have been either completely or partially solved (e.g. scholars have
expanded the range of data gathering techniques), while at the same time other
issues are still in place. Among the others, scarcity of international and interdisci-
plinary collaborations and the high number of one-time contributors are preventing
the field to develop in a more structured direction, therefore limiting the probability
for high-impact and practical research.
In spite of these structural limitations, we seek to demonstrate the potential ca-
pabilities of complex networks to highlight hidden patterns within the terrorist
global scenario, with the final aim to stimulate the debate on the application of
novel methodological frameworks to research on terrorism. Hidden patterns could
highlight operational similarities between groups that do not share any ideological
background, peculiar attack-planning characteristics related to actors operating in
certain areas, or even relevant behavioral differences between groups that fight for
similar motivations but are settled in distinct regions. Our intuition is that there is
first and foremost a need for advancing and experimenting novel methodological ap-
proaches that, in case of promising results, might be employed and applied to other
contexts with more reliable data, allowing to draw more useful and solid conclusions.
In fact, the unavailability of and search for better data should not stop the process
of innovation within the field. This works relies on data retrieved from the Global
Terrorism Database (GTD henceforth) on terrorist attacks occurred at global level
from 1997 to 2016. The paper aims to propose a new algorithm for detecting latent
clusters of terrorist groups expanding and extending the analytic approach we have
provided in [15]: we demonstrate that, tested against our previous approach (which
we will refer to as “baseline” throughout the paper) and a weak heuristic approach
based on pure groups ideology, our novel algorithm confirms many results obtained
with the baseline approach and also provides new interesting results on the hidden
similarities across groups belonging to very different contexts and motivations.
The paper is organized as follows: the next section provides a review of network-
and clustering-based approaches to the study of terrorism, trying to identify the
main areas of application in which these methods have been experimented. Follow-
ing, the “Data” section will thoroughly present the information contained in the
data employed to conduct our analyses. The “Methodology” section will describe
and explain the graph construction and algorithmic framework. The “Results” sec-
tion will then describe relevant outcomes and patterns found after the experiments.
Finally, “Discussion and Future Work” section will focus on the potential implica-
tions of this work, on its limits and on the possible directions that can be explored
using this paper as a starting point.
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Background
In recent years, one of the methodological frameworks that have been tested and
have attracted the attention of both scholars and policymakers in the social sciences
is network science, broadly intended [8]. Network science has gained popularity in
sociology [19, 29, 33], economics [11, 31, 53, 59], political science [27, 32, 49, 60]
and criminology [1, 12, 23, 43, 45].
This also applies to terrorism research. The first application of social network
analysis to terrorism, the branch of network science that specifically seeks to map
and study relation between human entities such as people or organizations, was the
renowned paper by Krebs [36]. Krebs tried to understand the existing connections
between hijackers and terrorists responsible for the 9/11 attacks using unstructured
data retrieved from open access sources, as newspapers. Despite its limited sophis-
tication, the study opened a path towards the study of terrorism under this new
perspective. Following this strategy, other scholars have used relational data on
individuals to reconstruct terrorist networks and investigate roles and key players
[4, 10, 35].
Shifting from the pure physical and relational information gathered and struc-
tured to investigate the structure of groups, scholars have also tested and simulated
the strength and resilience of terrorist networks. As an example, works in this area
have put a strong emphasis on the application for intelligence purposes. They have
relied on mathematical models focusing on network topology for either proposing
methods for maximizing efficiency in disruption strategies [17, 25, 40, 48] or under-
stand the most resilient topology structures to be learned from terrorism behavior
and applied to other domains (e.g. infrastructure networks) [30]. This interest to-
wards increasingly complex questions regarding the nature and behavior of terrorist
networks encourages scholars and scientists to integrate relational and topological
information on networks with their spatial and temporal dynamics. Spatial and
temporal dynamics are crucial when aiming at understanding the evolution of a
certain entity or phenomenon, therefore several works have focused on these as-
pects using either synthetic-generated data or real-world information on existing
networks [41, 42].
In the meanwhile, the revolution of social media has provided an unprecedented
and massive amount of data to study the online social behaviour of people. As for the
real physical world, individuals act criminally or violently also within the internet,
and therefore researchers have started to be attracted by the potential consequences
of criminal, and even terrorist, behaviors in the cyberspace. Indeed, a recent stream
of research has focused on the detection of terrorist or radical behaviors retrieving
network-information from social media platforms. Social media allow to go beyond
pure relational information, integrating instead geographical, temporal features and
many other profile attributes to infer patterns and dynamics of extremist users
[5, 9, 20, 34].
The previous lines of research, though generally different in their data gathering
techniques, modelling architectures and complexity scales, all mostly focus on map-
ping relations between individuals or, at most, organizations belonging to the same
terrorist sphere (e.g. the al Qaeda network). However, a very recent sub-domain
explored the power of the complex network landscape when dealing with event data
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and abstract meta-networks of attack characteristics, with the aim to predict future
terrorist behaviours in terms of target or weapon selection, targeted locations and
employed tactics [13, 24, 58] or, more broadly, to highlight operational similarities
between different terrorist organizations [14, 15].
While network approaches for modelling terrorism have gained a certain degree
of success and have tested and experimented techniques focusing on a variety of
research questions, it is worth to note how this advancements have not been fol-
lowed by the consequent combination of network science with unsupervised learning
and, more specifically, cluster analysis. In one of the first attempts at using cluster
analysis to group terrorist organizations, Chenoweth and Lowham [21] used data
on groups which targeted American citizens to explore alternative ways to conceive
terrorist typologies. Qi et al. [47] used both social network analysis and unsuper-
vised learning to group extremist web pages using an hierarchical multi-membership
clustering algorithm based on the similarity score of these pages. Finally, Lauten-
schlager et al [38] developed the Group Profiling Automation for Crime and Ter-
rorism (GPACT) prototype that generates terrorist group profiling via a multi-step
methodology that also includes clustering of terrorist events.
In light of this gap in research, following the intuition that network science may
provide rich insights on the terror phenomenon, we modify our previous proposed
methodology to test the performance of an automatic weighting scheme for the
Gower’s coefficient of similarity based on von Neumann’s Entropy to preserve in-
trinsic qualities of the data that already emerge from our baseline approach.
Data
This work relies on data retrieved from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD)
[37, 57]. The GTD is the most comprehensive and detailed open access dataset on
terrorist events at global scale, maintained by the START research center. Infor-
mation are gathered from different open sources, and events have to meet specific
criteria to be included in the database. These criteria are divided into two different
levels.
The first level criteria are three and have all to be verified. These mandatory ones
are related to (1) intentionality of the incident, (2) presence of violence (or immedi-
ate threat of violence) of the incident and (3) to the sub-national nature of terrorist
actors.
The second level criteria are three and at least two of them must be respected.
Second level criteria relate to (1) the specific political, economic, religious or social
goal of each act, (2) the evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate or convey
messages to larger audiences than the immediate victims, (3) the context of action
which has to be outside of legitimate warfare activities. Finally, although an event
respects these two levels, an additional filtering mechanism (variable doubter) con-
trols for conflicting information or acts that may not be of exclusive terrorist nature
[55]. For our analysis, we aggregated data (i.e., we did not separate by year or other
time windows) from 1997 to 2016 on worldwide events and related perpetrators,
excluding all the attacks which were of doubtful terrorist nature.[1] This method-
[1]We have also excluded attacks from 1970 to 1996 because, as reported in the
official GTD codebook, many variables on attacks occurred prior to 1997 were not
available or sufficiently reliable.
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ological choice led from 106,114 events to a total of 88,513. Furthermore, we have
removed all the events plotted by “Unknown” actors. Considering the large amount
of attacks with no identified perpetrator, we would have faced the risk of biased
results. We have thus kept only attacks of clear terrorist nature with an identified
author, accounting for a total of 41,456 events.
The multi-partite network which has been created and employed for our study
relied on six main terrorist dimensions, namely: Events (N=41,456), Groups
(N=1,493), Targets (N=22)[2], Weapons (N=13)[3], Tactics (N=9)[4] and operat-
ing Regions (N=12) [5]. These dimensions have been chosen because they represent
the visible core of terrorist activity: the terror attack itself can indeed be repre-
sented by its perpetrator, the chosen target, the employed weapons and tactics and
the geographic and political context in which it occurred. These variables are thus
helpful in gathering a rich knowledge structure that will then be crucial for our
methodology.
In addition to this information which represent the basis of this work, other vari-
ables extracted from the GTD and other sources have been employed to detect
and assess behavioral patterns of terrorist groups belonging to the same clusters ex
post. This information will include group-based attributes regarding terrorist activ-
ity such as ideology, success rate, suicide rate, fatality rate, casualty rate, multiplot
rate, international rate and number of targeted countries. The ideology of each
group has been mapped using existing information present in two open access data
sets (Big Allied and Dangerous 1 and an extraction of Big Allied and Dangerous
2) when that information was available within those sources [2], and by exception
from other qualitative open access information sources.
This mapping led to include seven ideology categories: (i) Islamist/Jihadist groups,
(ii) Far Left/Anarchist/Communist (FL), (iii) Far Right/Racist/Nazi (FR), (iv)
Ethno-Nationalist, (v) Other/Unknown, (vi) Religious (Islam excluded), (vii)
Animal-rights/Environmentalist. A given group may belong to more than one cate-
gory at a time (e.g.: the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine which contains
at the same time elements of Marxism and Nationalism) (Table 1). It is worth to
specify that these are labels that aim at giving context regarding the main moti-
vations and ideological positions of the groups. This of course does not imply that
[2]Targets list includes: Abortion Related, Government (General), Private Citizens &
Property, Business, Religious Figures/Institutions, Police, Airports & Aircraft, Util-
ities, Educational Institution, Unknown, Journalists & Media, Government (Diplo-
matic), Other, Military, Telecommunication, Tourists, Terrorists/Non-State Militia,
Transportation, NGO, Violent Political Party, Maritime, Food or Water Supply.
[3]Weapons list includes: Incendiary, Explosives/Bombs/Dynamite, Firearms, Un-
known, Melee, Fake Weapons, Chemical, Other, Sabotage Equipment, Vehicle (not
to include vehicle-borne explosives, i.e., car or truck bombs), Biological
[4]Tactics list includes: Facility/Infrastructure Attack, Bombing/Explosion, Armed
Assault, Unknown, Assassination, Hostage Taking (Kidnapping), Unarmed Assault,
Hijacking, Hostage Taking (Barricade Incident)
[5]Operating Region list covers the entire world and specifically includes: North
America, South Asia, Middle East & North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, Western
Europe, Eastern Europe, South America, Southeast Asia, East Asia, Central Amer-
ica & Caribbean, Australasia & Oceania, Central Asia
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enviromentalism, for instance, has to be associated with terrorism per se. These
categories only mean that a given group that has plotted at least one attack in-
cluded in the GTD had motivations and roots that can be matched with a given
ideology. The same applies to left-wing or right-wing organizations: having a par-
ticular political position does not automatically qualify an existing entity (either a
person or a group) as terrorist. However, there are diverted and extremist positions
on both political sides that are tightly connected with groups and actors that have
been responsible of terrorist acts.
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics of Group Ideologies
Ideology N groups Share
Islamist/Jihadism 462 0.31
FL 271 0.18
Ethno/Nationalist 601 0.40
FR 50 0.03
Other/Unknown 206 0.14
Religion (No Islam) 45 0.03
Animal/Environmentalist 14 0.01
N of ideologies N groups Share
1 1347 0.90
2 136 0.09
3 10 0.01
Total 1493 1.00
The success share is given by the ratio between the successful attacks and the
total number of events attributed to a given group. The suicide share maps the
ratio of suicide attacks over the total number of events plotted by the same group.
Fatality and casualty ratios are produced by the number of attacks with at least
one dead victim (fatality) or one wounded victim (casualty) divided by the total
number of events. The international rate is simply the ratio between attacks with
some international features (e.g. logistic organization) and the total number of at-
tacks. Finally, multiplot share quantifies the share of attacks that were part of a
coordinated strategy (e.g. 9/11 case), out of total attacks. All these variables seek
to enrich the knowledge associated to each group and to understand whether the
identified clusters highlight certain patterned and eventually unexpected behaviors
(Table 2).
Table 2 Group-based Attributes on Terrorist Activity - Descriptive Statistics
Mean St.Dev. Median Min Max
Events 27.76 205.81 2.00 1.00 5,634
Success Share 0.90 0.24 1.00 0.00 1.00
Suicide Share 0.03 0.14 0.00 0.00 1.00
Fatality Ratio 2.75 8.55 0.50 0.00 170
Casualty Ratio 7.88 23.34 1.67 0.00 385.29
Multiplot Share 0.14 0.28 0.00 0.00 1.00
International Share 0.29 0.41 0.00 0.00 1.00
N Targeted Countries 1.35 1.83 1.00 1.00 42
Methodology
At the general level, the entropy-based approach that is presented and analyzed in
this work is structured as follows: (i) calculation of the weights of each mode using
the graph entropy of that mode; (ii) computation of the weighted Gower’s Coef-
ficient of Similarity between each of the terrorist groups using the entropy as the
Campedelli et al. Page 7 of 24
weight; (iii) extraction of the latent network from the pairwise Gower’s Coefficient
similarities and analyze its structural and intra-cluster properties. The detailed pro-
cess is described in the following subsections.
The entropy-based method will be then compared with the baseline model presented
in [15] and with a heuristic method. The baseline model uses a simplified version of
Gower’s method. In this simplified version, no weights are applied to the different
modes and we only consider the natural structure of the data deriving from the
affinity matrix that originates by the pairwise Gower’s coefficient of similarity. In
other words, instead of using the graph entropy of each mode as its weight, every
mode is simply just given a weight of one. The heuristic method we use for com-
parison only uses groups’ ideologies as the clustering criterion. In this method, we
just use the dominant ideology of a particular terrorist group as its cluster label.
So, if two groups share a dominant ideology, like Ethno/Nationalist, then they are
in the same cluster.
Entropy-based Gower’s Method for Multi-partite Data
Since the variables of the modes of Targets, Weapons, Tactics, and Regions form a
many-to-many relationship with the terrorist groups, we first model this data as a
multi-partite network (Figure 1) with each partition joined to the terrorist groups;
this is often referred to as a ‘Star’ structure with the partitions.
Target 
1
Target 
2
Group i
Weapon 
2
Region 
1 
Region 
2
Weapon 
1
Group j
Tactic 1
Target 
3
Success Ratio, 
Multiplot Share, 
Casualty Ratio, 
Ideology, etc
Success Ratio, 
Multiplot Share, 
Casualty Ratio, 
Ideology, etc
Figure 1 Example of a Multi-partite Network The graphic illustrations shows a multi-partite
network that includes two groups i and j
More specifically, we define:
GN := 〈(V1, V2, · · · , Vn) , (E1,2, E1,3, · · · , Em,n) , (WE1,2, · · · ,WEm,n)〉 (1)
as a multi-partite graph that contains N partitions describing relations between
different sets of nodes Vm and Vn: these relations are formalized as edges Em,n
that are weighted by W ∈ R≥0 and each mode in the multi-partite network is
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represented as Gm,n :=
〈
(Vm, Vn) , Em,n,WEm,n
〉
. With this data structure we then
employ Gower’s Coefficient of Similarity [28] to place the groups in a latent space,
whereby we can create a latent network of the groups and assign groups to clusters
based upon the multi-partite network. In the latent network, the edges maps the
similarity between group i and j, calculated using Gower’s Similarity Coefficient
defined as:
Sij =
∑n
k=1 wijkS
(k)
ij∑K
k=1 wijk
(2)
where Sij is the similarity between terrorist groups i and j on a variable (i.e. Targets,
Weapons, etc.), k, and K is the total number of variables across all N modes, and
wijk is the weight of the similarity between group i and group j for variable k. S
(k)
ij
is then dually defined as:
S
(k)
ij :
{
1, if(xik = xjk) 6= ∅
0, otherwise
(3)
if the variable, k, is categorical (to include binary) for node i and j’s responses, xik,
xjk, and:
S
(k)
ij :
|xik − xjk|
rk
(4)
where rk is the range of xk, if k is numerical. For each variable, k that is numerical
the range is calculated as:
rk = |max(xk)−min(xk)| (5)
which means that the range is given by the absolute value of the maximum value
of the variable k minus the minimum value of the variable k. Gower’s coefficient
of similarity provides a wide degree of flexibility as it can take various data types,
like integer, binary, or continuous values and does so without the use of dummy
variables. So, with this coefficient of similarity we are able to incorporate various
means of describing terrorist groups, which can be of nearly any data type, and do
so in such a way that keeps the original structure of each of the modes as bipartite
networks intact.
Another advantage of Gower’s Coefficient is the weighting term. As was noted at
the beginning of this section, each of the possible variables used to find similarity
between terrorist groups are not independent, but rather fall into various related
modes. For example, if group i has operated in the Middle East, it is possible that
it has also operated in North Africa or Southwest Asia. Furthermore, since the
relationships within the mode are many to many (e.g. a terrorist groups can use
many different weapons and vice-versa) each of these modes are a bipartite net-
work. Thus, our data is modeled as a collection of bipartite networks, where there
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are relationships between the entities within each of the mode networks. So, to take
advantage of this model of our data, we employed network entropy as the means to
weight different modes for the weighting scheme in the Gower’s Coefficient [46]. Von
Neumann’s network entropy is a spectral measure originating from Gibbs entropy
that has been applied to the quantum realm and that provides information on the
complexity of a graph and on the amount of information that a network contains.
In general, network entropy can be thought of as a measure of how heterogeneous a
network is in terms of its connections [46], [26]. As such, network entropy has been
used to characterize changes within dynamic graphs, as it is good as distinguishing
different graph snapshots from each other [62]. Furthermore, network entropy has
also been used a means of distinguishing certain graphs from each other, with those
graphs that have a higher entropy having more complex structures like subgroups
[46], [61]. So, we similarly employ network entropy to distinguish between the differ-
ent modes, which are bipartite networks, in such a way that those modes that have
more heterogeneous structures — and as such are likely to be better for separating
terrorist groups into clusters — are considered as more important. Since Gower’s
Coefficient allows for weighting for exactly the purpose of emphasizing more im-
portant features in data, we can use network entropy with the weighting term in
Gower’s Coefficient to automatically emphasize more useful modes of our data. Fol-
lowing the derivations of the entropy of a network in [46] and [54], we define the
entropies of each of our modes as:
Hn = −
|V |∑
i=1
λ˜i
|V | ln
λ˜i
|V | (6)
where λ˜i are the eigenvalues of the normalized Laplacian of the graph of the par-
ticular mode. So, for n ∈ N the normalized Laplacian is L˜n = D− 12 (D −Xn)D− 12 ,
where (D −Xn) is the unnormalized Laplacian and therefore Xn is the adjacency
matrix from a particular mode and D is the degree matrix, which is created by:
D :
{∑V
j=1Xij if Dii
0 otherwise
(7)
Following the findings on using network entropies to characterize heterogeneous
graphs in [62] and [26], we let those modes with higher entropy have more impact
on the similarity measurements through Gower’s coefficient. So, the weighting term
in our Gower’s coefficient is:
wijk =
N∑
n
δ(k, n)×Hn (8)
where δ(k, n) is an indicator function that returns 1 if variable k is in mode n, and
0 otherwise. It should be noted that each variable within a mode will recieve the
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same weight. So, those modes which have a more heterogeneous structure, which
should be better for producing structures like clusters, will have a higher weight in
the comparison of the various terrorist groups.
Asymmetric kNN Modularity Graph Construction
Having obtained pairwise similarities between all of the terrorist actors, we now
move on to extracting a network from the data, which we refer to as the latent
network. Following our work in [15], we continue to use the kNN modularity maxi-
mization procedure proposed in [50]. At a a high level, once similarities have been
computed for each of the terrorist groups, the method iterates through various pos-
sible numbers of neighbors for each node, k, and selects that k which produces the
most modular graph, relative to a null-model, random graph produced on the same
similarities. Modularity in this case is the network modularity as described in [44]:
mod(G) =
1
2m
∑
ij
[Aij − deg(i)× deg(j)
2m
δ(ci, cj)] (9)
where m is the number of links in the network, and c are the cluster assignments
of the nodes. A graph with high modularity is one which will have sub groups that
have a lot of interconnections. Since it is known that random graphs can give rise to
modular structures, we also compare this modularity value to the modularity value
obtained from a random graph with the same number of vertices and edges, and
the same similarities between the vertices [50]. The general idea behind this method
is that a kNN that is higher in modularity, relative to a null-model, is better for
detecting community structure in the underlying data used to make the network. It
should be noted that this procedure applies only after a measure of similarity has
been applied to the data.
We have, however, modified the algorithm slightly to better suit our data. First,
we use an asymetric kNN network. More precisely, for each point i, let Nk(i) be
the k nearest neighbors of i, then an asymmetric kNN network has links between
two nodes i and j if i ∈ Nk(j) OR j ∈ Nk(i). Second, in the clustering step,
we differ from the original algorithm proposed in [50], as we use a faster method of
modularity maximization of unimodal networks, the Louvain Method [7], as opposed
to the author’s QCut algorithm. The psuedo-code of our implementation of network
construction by kNN modularity maximization is detailed in algorithm 1.
In Algorithm 1, Gk is a particular kNN graph, where each vertex connects to
exactly k of its nearest neighbors. The sub-step of randomize(Gk) is to randomly
re-wire all of the edges in Gk. This is equivalent to creating an Erdos-Renyi random
graph that has the same number of edges and vertices as Gk. This step is performed
in order to create a null-model of Gk, so that we can get a better idea of the strength
of the modularity of the proposed Gk by comparing it to the modularity of its null
counterpart, Grk. So, a good kNN should not just have high modularity, but also
high modularity with respect to a randomized version of that kNN; the modular
structures should not be just an artifact of the kNN’s density or size. Finally, we
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Algorithm 1 kNN Modularity Maximization Procedure
input: Distance or Affinity Matrix, S, (n x n)
output: Optimal k-Nearest Neighbor Network, G∗, and sub group assignments C(G∗).
for i = 1 : blog2(n)c do
k ← 2i
Gk ← kNN(S, k)
C(Gk)← Louvain(Gk)
Grk ← randomize(Gk)
C(Grk)← Louvain(Grk)
Modularityk ←Modularity(C(Gk))−Modularity(C(Grk))
end for
k∗ ← argmaxkModularityk
G∗ ← kNN(s, k∗)
C(G∗)← Louvain(G∗)
return C(G∗), G∗
return G∗ which is that kNN which has the most modular structure. A Python
implementation of the code will be available on the author’s GitHub page with
publication of this article.
Results
Comparing clustering assignments
To compare the similarity of clustering assignments of the three grouping procedures
we have calculated the Adjusted Mutual Information (AMI), which is a modified
version of the ordinary mutual information adjusted for randomness, and it is cal-
culated as
AMI(U, V ) =
MI(U, V )− E {MI(U, V )}
max {H(U), H(V )} − E {MI(U, V )} (10)
where E {MI(U, V )} is the expected mutual information between two random clus-
terings and H(U) and H(V ) are the entropies associated to each partition U and
V . This is a standard way to measure how different or similar are the outcomes of
clustering procedures. The results are displayed in Figure 2.
Figure 2 Adjusted Mutual Information of three Subrgrouping Schemes. The ideology-based
heuristic approach produces subgroupings which are extremely different when compared with the
baseline and the entropy-based approach
The results clearly show how, with respect to the baseline unweighted model,
subgrouping using entropy weighting is far more similar than the ideology-based
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subgrouping. This, on one hand, suggests that relying only on this latter heuris-
tic can extremely underestimate and distort the latent similarity that exist across
groups when fully considering behavioral or operational variables. While ideology
is certainly important for contextualizing a certain terrorist actor, the multi-partite
original network includes information that are not captured by this method.
On the other hand, the entropy-based weighting is able to capture a relatively
high portion of the information associated with the unweighted baseline model.
While certainly introducing this data-driven discriminatory procedure affects the
final clusters, our first conclusion is that this method is far more reliable if we want
to preserve the original information structure of our data. Moreover, this algorithmic
approach might provide a more solid tool to analysts and policymakers if they need
to go beyond the original data, exploiting the richness of the original data itself.
Given these results, we now proceed to compare the baseline and the entropy-
based clusterings more in depth, to understand whether, besides pure group as-
signments, they also share stable similarities in terms of behavioral and ideological
features.
Unweighted vs Entropy-based Subgrouping: Similarities and Differences
Our algorithmic procedure to create the k-Nearest Neighbor network yielded two
different graphs. Focusing on global characteristics of both networks, we can high-
light how these graphs hold distinct structural and topological characteristics (Table
3).
Table 3 Network structural and topological characteristics for both approaches
Unweighted Entropy-based
Best k 2 4
Modularity 0.805 0.390
N of Links 5,242 10,658
Bi-directional Link Count 2,621 5,329
Density 0.002 0.004
Clustering Coefficient 0.342 0.336
Betweenness Centralization 0.656 0.596
Eigenvector Centralization 0.826 0.703
Total Degree Centralization 0.106 0.257
The table above highlights how the k-NN procedure provided two different opti-
mal k’s for the two networks. The entropy-based network has a higher k, and this
justifies the higher number of links (both overall and bi-directional), and the higher
network density. Nonetheless, the unweighted network proves to be higher in cluster-
ing coeficient, betweenness centralization and eigenvector centralization, while the
entropy-based one yielded higher total degree centralization. With regard to mod-
ularity, the unweighted network notably performs a higher value, suggesting that
the emerging clusters are more defined than the ones yielded by the entropy-based
approach.
Connected to this aspect, and with regard to the actual subgroupings, is the
fact that the entropy-based procedure produced less clusters (21) compared to the
unweighted one (37). As Figure 3 shows, the entropy-based approach produces a
greater number of highly populated clusters, while in the unweighted case, a con-
siderable amount of clusters includes a little number of groups (in fact, 25 clusters
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include less than 50 terrorist groups each). These figures further justify the differ-
ent scores in term of modularity, since a higher number of smaller clusters is highly
likely to indicate a higher degree of diversity in the network itself, as captured by
modularity.
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Figure 3 Distribution of Cluster Assignments per Different Approach The unweighted approach
produces a higher number of small clusters, highlighting a higher modularity.
Focusing on the different node-level measure distributions, Figure 4 displays his-
tograms and 2D Kernel Density Estimations (KDE) of three selected metrics,
namely Log Unscaled Total Degree Centrality, Log Betweenness Centrality and
Clustering Coefficient. Total Degree Centrality and Betweenness Centrality have
been transformed in log scale in order to provide more intuitive graphic results,
since the original distributions are extremely left-skewed and the bivariate visual-
izations would have been extremely difficult to interpret.
Regarding Log Unscaled Total Degree Centrality, the histogram highlights how
the groups in the Entropy-based approach generally have less connections that the
ones in the Unweighted approach. The 2D KDE displays a strong concentration of
data points in the bottom-left side of the graph, with more dense concentrations.
With regards to Log Betweenness Centrality, the histogram shows relatively similar
distributions for the considered approaches. The Unweighted one displays a greater
number of groups with betweenness equal to zero (log(n) ≈ −3).[6] The 2D KDE
displays a very high concentration of nodes on the top right of the plot, showing a
positive correlation of log betweenness centrality across nodes for both approaches.
However, it is worth noting that there is also an interesting small concentration of
nodes that have very high value in the Entropy-based case but, conversely, very low
ones in the Unweighted case.
Conversely, in relation to clustering coefficient, more evident differences emerge
when looking at the histogram. In fact, the Entropy-based approach shows a more
[6]When betweenness was equal to 0 we have transformed it to 0.001 in order to allow
the value for log transformation. This transformation did not affect the results since
it was performed only to provide intuitive visualizations and interpretable bivariate
relations
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Figure 4 Histograms (20 bins) and 2D Kernel Density Estimation of Log Unscaled Total
Degree Centrality, Log Betweenness Centrality and Clustering Coefficient of Terrorist Groups
across both approaches 2D Kernel Density Estimations are performed through regular grids made
of 500 bins for each axis.
concentrated distribution, while the Unweighted one highlights a very different be-
havior, with a considerably high number of extreme values, on both left and right
side of the x-axis. However, these differences are mitigated in the KDE plot. Indeed,
it shows the concentration of the majority of data points in the bottom left, almost
indicating a linear relationship. In spite of this, it is wort noting that there exist
a portion of groups which obtain very high levels of clustering coefficient in the
Unweighted case, while their corresponding values in the Entropy-based approach
are significantly lower. In light of the considerations on these detected differences in
topology, structural and node-level measures of both networks and cluster forma-
tion, it is worth inspecting the types of groups in terms of operational and behavioral
features and ideologies that are clustered together in both approaches.
The correlation results interestingly showcase that the majority of relations (either
positive or negative) hold stably across both approaches, while only few have oppo-
site directions from one approach to the other (Figure 5). Notably, correlations on
events (first columns of both plots) are generally very different. This may suggest
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that the raw number of events do not drive any consistent information flow regard-
ing cluster assignments. This would indicate that there are other types of features
that actually capture similarities or differences across terror groups, and that the
latent data structure is independent from the individual frequency of attacks of
actors. In terms of stable results, both approaches demonstrate how clusters with
a high percentage of islamist or jihadist groups are associated with high levels of
attack success, while this type of relation goes in the opposite direction for all the
other ideologies. This marks a distinctive feature of jihadism or islamism as terror
motivation. Expectedly, suicide attacks are also found to be positively correlated
with jihadist or islamist ideology. Furthermore, Islamist/jihadist ideology is again
the only one positively associated with high levels of both casualties and fatalities in
both approaches, while other ideologies seem to be less lethal. In terms of the mul-
tiplot, which captures the extent to which a terrorist group is able to plot multiple
coordinated attacks in the same day as part of a more complex logistic structure,
FL groups, along with religious (non-Islamist) groups, are the only ideologies to
display a stable, positive relation.
Clear results emerge when focusing on pairwise relations between ideologies (Fig-
ure 6). Overall, the majority of relations are stable across both algorithmic ap-
proaches. Islamism has negative correlations in both cases with all the other ide-
ologies, implying that groups belonging to or motivated by this ideology represent
very distinguished entities in the global terrorist scenario. With regard to FL groups,
they strongly share similar cluster assignments with enviromentalist and animalist
groups and, surprisingly, they share similar assignments also with FR actors.
This result suggest that, while these two ideologies are considered very different
from one another and the motivations of groups belonging to these factions are
extremely distant, from the operational point of view (namely, from the stand-
point of employed weapons, hit targets, applied tactics and targeted regions) FL
and FR terrorist groups are quite similar, and this result is corroborated by its
stability across the two approaches. FL groups are not the only actors that share
cluster assignments with FR terrorists. In fact, the analysis show that the higher
the fraction of FR groups, the higher the number of religious (Islam excluded) and
ethno/nationalist actors.
These type of relations might be expected, considering that many FR groups
include elements of bigotry or radical religious views and that many nationalist
actors generally rely upon fascist or far-right discourse and political behaviours.
However, another surprising result is given by the negative relation between FL and
ethno/nationalist groups, considering two factors: first, the positive stable correla-
tion between FR and FL groups; second, the fact that radical leftist or communist
ideologies are generally the other opposite driving force of certain nationalist or
independence-driven actors, such as the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in Spain.
This means that, besides the potentially similar motivations and background, these
two types of groups act and organize attacks that are generally dissimilar.
Potential Directions: Introducing a Dynamic Entropy-based Approach
The comparative analysis across the two approaches demonstrated that the entropy-
based approach preserves a relatively high amount of outcomes derived from the
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Figure 5 Correlation among behavioral and ideological variables Unweighted (left) and
Entropy-based (right) approaches Correlation shows what bivariate relations stay stable across
both approaches (namely, they maintain the same direction). Bottom plot highlights (in black)
stable relations against non-stable (white).
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Figure 6 Kernel Density, Histogram and Scatter Plots of Cluster Distribution for Both
Approaches - Ideological Variables The graphic visualizations demonstrates that more represented
or well-defined ideologies tend to have stabler relations across both approaches. Relation for
environmental/animalist and religious (Islamist excluded) groups appear to be more volatile.
baseline model, also shedding light on additional mechanisms when focusing on the
ex-post analysis of behavioral and ideological features. However, our experiment
comes with a limitation that should be adressed in the future. In fact, our original
multi-partite network spans across twenty years and includes the cross-sectional
information on the whole universe of active groups without taking into account
time in a dynamic fashion.
Terrorism has undergone several changes in the last two decades: many new groups
have appeared only recently, many have disappeared or have been dismantled, other
actors have been active only for very short period. In general, over the years, the
trend of active actors has not shown a stable behavior. As it is expected, this type
of trend also regards the number of attacks and terrorist events (Figure 7).
These changes and trends over the last twenty years may also be related to strate-
gies and types of attack, besides mere frequency of attacks. This is an aspect which
intersects our analysis. Since our original multi-partite network stores all the infor-
mation of the past twenty years, these changes and trends may be underestimated
or even vanish altogether in our algorithmic procedure. As for the current data
structure, groups that have plotted very few attacks in two distant years may be
clustered together considering their similarity in the data space, however, it might
be not useful for analysts or policy-makers to compare two groups that are too
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Figure 7 Number of Active Groups and Terror Attacks per Year (1997-2016).
distant in time. For this reason, our intuition is to introduce a potential solution to
this issue via a dynamic Entropy-based approach. Instead of constructing a single
static multi-partite network, we build yearly multi-partite graphs to capture the
variations in the entropy of each mode (Figure 8).
Figure 8 Entropy variation for each mode (1997-2016).
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As shown by the plot above, there exists clear variations in the entropies of each
mode from which we have built our multi-partite network. The plot highlights how
the Weapon mode generally follows completely different trends with respect to all
the others. At the same time, the entropies of Tactic and Target modes display very
similar behavior in the last four years of our considered timespan. Notably, there is
an almost complete similarity of entropies for Region, Tactic and Target modes with
respect to year 2001. This graph clearly suggests that time should be considered
in the algorithmic procedure, since it is highly likely that sensible changes in the
subgrouping outcomes will emerge. Besides the relevance of embedding temporal
dynamics from the purely research point of view, this furthermore provides a richer
tool for potential users and analysts interested in using the algorithm to detect,
assess and study patterns in the data. In fact, since our model seeks to provide a
practical framework that can be easily deployed for the aforementioned purposes,
we feel that time-aware results are able to exclude all the non-active groups in a
given year and would increase the usability of previous years information and its
efficiency for real-time objectives oriented to intelligence profiling.
Discussion & Future Work
This work has presented a novel algorithmic framework for detecting latent clus-
ters of similar terrorist groups via a complex network approach. We have created a
multi-partite network for the entire known population of terror groups active world-
wide from 1997 to 2016, where modes were Weapons, Tactics, Targets, operating
Regions, and proposed a novel clustering architecture expanded from [15]. We have
then compared our new entropy-based architecture with two alternative solutions:
a weak-heuristic approach based on terror group clustering by ideology and our
baseline unweighted approach. The entropy-based approach modifies the baseline
approach simply weighting each mode by its graph entropy, in order to provide
a data-driven approach that takes into account the relevance of a certain mode
with respect to the others. The analysis has first demonstrated that subgrouping
by ideology leads to cluster assignments very different to the ones obtained with our
baseline method, where we let patterns emerge naturally from data with no a priori
knowledge and, secondly, that the entropy-based and the baseline approaches have
similar results both in terms of stability of cluster assignment for terrorist groups
and behavioral and ideological intra-cluster association.
Both approaches corroborated interesting findings that go beyond the pure method-
ological intent of this work. To investigate the meta-connections between groups
resulting from our work, we have analyzed behavioral characteristics (e.g., share
of successful attacks, international propensity, etc.) and we have also focused on
the ideological background of each actor, retrieving this information from BAAD
version 1 and 2 and other open access qualitative sources. Though labelling a group
under few ideological categories may oversimplify certain complex components of
terrorism, interesting relations emerged. Besides several expected patterns (e.g. Is-
lamist/jihadist groups tend not to be associated with groups belonging to other
ideologies), the algorithm reveals other results that may shed light on terrorism in
terms of research and policy. The clustering procedures highlighted a certain sim-
ilarity between FL groups and FR groups, indicating that besides their divergent
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objectives and goals, these two types of groups share similar behaviors. Furthermore,
FL groups on one side are often associated with animal-rights and environmentalist
actors, suggesting that some overlapping in terms of motives and aims is also con-
nected to similar methods and ways of acting. On the other side, FR groups tend
to be clustered together with ethno/nationalist and religious groups, as it might be
expected given that many FR groups hold nationalist or religion-related elements.
Overall, the entropy-based approach is a flexible tool for capturing the intrinsic and
hidden knowledge included in the manifold via a data-driven procedure, rather than
using subjective knowledge and weaker heuristics, which was one of the limitations
of several experiments conducted in [15].
In spite of the aforementioned results, our approach may suffer from the fact that
the original multi-partite network does not take time into account. Indeed, the man-
ifold includes the whole set of available data from 1997 and 2016. This might be
interpreted as a limitation, especially considering that our work is inherently policy-
oriented. The last twenty years have been susceptible of several dramatic changes in
the ways terrorism manifests itself at global scale. On one side, they have seen the
rise of islamist and jihadist terrorism not only in Africa and Middle East, but also
in Western and Eastern Europe and countries of the North America. On the other
side, politically motivated terrorism has showed shifts and different concentration
over time and space. Furthermore, the considered time span is relatively long and
therefore includes groups that may have been already disappeared and dismantled
or even actors that have plotted one or very few single attacks, therefore constitut-
ing a sort of ”noise” in the whole scenario.
In light of this, we have opened the path for future work showing that, besides
variations in the trends of active groups and actors and plotted attacks, there exist
also significant variations in the entropies of each mode over time. Entropies change
sensibly over-time and we have highlighted the presence of some similarities in these
trends across certain modes (e.g. Tactic and Target), while others follow completely
different behaviors (e.g. Weapon). For these reasons, future work should test the
entropy-based setup within a dynamic framework. While considering all the groups
and being able of compare still active groups with those that have been already dis-
mantled or disrupted is certainly useful, we feel that controlling for the noise in the
manifold and including only groups that are still part of the global terrorist scenario
will provide more insights and will help policy-makers or analysts in understanding
to what extent certain groups are similar or different compared to others. Addition-
ally, leveraging upon the entropy-based structure automatically allows one to take
into account the most relevant sources of information in real-time (e.g. modes): this
type of setup, for instance, would be capable of highlighting anomalous behaviours
or strategical behavioral evolution of certain terror groups. Future work will also
seek to eventually exclude groups that are not strictly considerable as terrorists
(e.g., Mexican drug cartels) although their actions are of terrorist nature: this op-
eration would reduce potential noise and distortion of the results.
Finally, inherent limitations come from the data. While the GTD is certainly the
most reliable and solid open access dataset freely available for research-purposes on
terrorist events, its structure poses issues of missing data and level of detail of the
information. Despite the fact that, as opposed to other criminal phenomena, terror-
ist attacks tracked and recorded do not face the risk of underestimation (generally,
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every terrorist attack is reported by newspapers or media agencies), not all details
on the attacks might be consistently retrieved and included in the dataset. This
would therefore lead to a certain degree of bias or missing information regarding
event characteristics, which are the core of our work. Another linked type of limi-
tation is the risk of too generic information, especially for terror attacks occurred
outside Europe and North America (which are actually the majority of the events).
While our algorithmic framework has demonstrated a certain degree of potential
using the GTD, the intent is to test it on more detailed databases in the future.
Additionally, in our algorithmic framework, we do not consider any correlation be-
tween the different modes of the data. More specifically, it is possible that certain
groups use certain weapons or tactics because of limited availability of alternative
means and not, instead, as the product of a free choice. Unfortunately, we are not
able to assess whether this is the case for the groups under analysis, but this poten-
tial explanation shall be kept in mind. Additionally, the ideology labelling process,
though based on a scientifically recognized dataset, may oversimplify certain char-
acteristics and motivations behind each group’s actions. Reducing the complexity
of the causes and motives behind the decision to resort to terrorism is challenging
and attention should be payed not to provide distorted or biased interpretation of
the results.
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